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We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that 
every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying endowments under a fairly wide class of 
scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable 
matchings may be disjoint.
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1 Introduction
Sertel and  Ozkal-Sanver (2002) study matching problems with endowments for one-to-one
matching models under given monotonic consumption rules. They analyze the manipulability
of optimal matching rules via endowments and show that men (respectively, women) can
manipulate the women- (men-) optimal matching rule by destroying (hence hiding) as well
as predonating their endowments. Furthermore, they show that the men- (women-) optimal
matching rule is non-manipulable via hiding (hence destroying) by a man (woman) under
all monotonic consumption rules. They characterize the classes of consumption rules under
which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via destruction, hiding, and perfect hiding
while Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2004) characterize it for predonation. Atlamaz and Klaus
(2006) study the manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods.
Afacan (2011) studies application fee manipulations.
We carry this analysis to many-to-one matching problems, in particular to the university
admission problem1. Interestingly, any stable matching rule is manipulable by universities
via destroying and via their endowments under a fairly wide class of exogenous scholarship
rules. Furthermore, we dene a destruction game. We show that the set of Nash equilibria
of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint.
2 Basic Notions
We take as given two nonempty, nite and disjoint sets S = fs1;s2;:::;skg and U =
fu1;u2;:::;ulg, where jSj = k  3 and jUj = l  2. Let A = S[U be the set of agents. Here,
S stands for a set of students and U for a set of universities. By convention, we say that
a student is assigned to the ctitious university u0 = 2 U whenever he/she is assigned to no
university. We assume that there are sucient number of students, so that all universities
ll their quotas.
For each agent i 2 A the set of potential mates of i, denoted by A(i), is dened as
A(i) =

2Snf;g if i 2 U
U [ fuog if i 2 S:
A university u 2 U admits as many students as its capacity qu which is a positive integer.
By convention, we have quo = k. Moreover, we have qu  2 for some u 2 U. We denote
q = (quo;qu1;:::; qul) by a capacity vector.
A matching  : S ! U [ fu0g is a function such that, for all s 2 S;(s) = fug for
some u 2 U [fu0g and #fs 2 S j u = (s)  qug for all u 2 U [fu0g: We denote an inverse
relation  1 : U [fuog ! S as  1(u) = fs 2 S j u = (s)g for all u 2 U [fuog: Let M(A)
denote the set of all matchings for A.
Each university u 2 U [fuog has a non-negative endowment ei 2 <+; whereas students




Each student s 2 S consumes a pair zs = (u;m) which consists of a university u 2
U [fuog and some amount of money m 2 <+ . Let  = U [fuog<+ denote the set of all
such university-money pairs. We assume that each student s has a complete and transitive
1An extended abstract of this paper took place in the Proceedings of the Workshop on Rationality and
Knowledge, Artemov and Parikh, eds., 2006.
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preference, denoted by Rs, over , satisfying the following properties: For any s 2 S, any
two universities u;u0 2 U [ fuog; any amount of money m;m0 2 <+, (i) (u0;m) Rs (u;m)
if and only if (u0;0) Rs (u;0) and (ii) (u;m0) Rs (u;m) if and only if m0  m. Let Ps
and Is respectively denote the strict and indierence relations associated with the preference
relation Rs: Let RS denote the preference prole of students.
Each university has a complete, transitive and antisymmetric preference relation over
individual students.2 Furthermore, we assume that each university has a responsive pref-
erence relation Ru on 2Snf;g to its preferences over individual students, in the sense that
for any two assignments that dier in only one student, a university prefers the assignment
containing the more preferred student (Roth (1985)).3 Let RU = (Ru)u2U be the preference
prole. Let Pu and Iu respectively denote the strict relation associated with the preference
relation Ru:
Fixing the society A, the capacity vector q, the preference prole of students RS and
the preference prole of universities RU, we refer e 2 <
l+1




as the environment. We assume that scholarships
are distributed according to some exogenous scholarship rules h : U  <+  S ! <+ . In
other words, under a scholarship rule h, each university u oers each student s some of its
endowment e as scholarship which is denoted by hsu(e). Let H be the class of exogenous
scholarship rules satisfying the following properties:
1. h is announced before the matching occurs and is independent of the matching incurred.
For all u 2 U; for all qu 2 <+; for all eu 2 <+; and
2. for all Ru 2 <+; hsu(e)  0 for all s 2 S and for all eu 2 <++; hsu(e) > 0 for some
s 2 S,
3. for all s;s0 2 S; hsu(e) > hs0u(e) implies s Pu s0,
4. for all S0  S with jS0j  qu;
P
s2S0 hsu(e)  eu,
5. for any s 2 S with hsu(e) > 0 and for any e0 with e0
u < eu and e0
 u = e u; hsu(e0) <
hsu(e).
6. There exists some u 2 U with capacity qu  2; some preference prole Ru and en-
dowment eu 2 <++ such that hsu(e) > 0 where s is ranked by u as the second best
student.
The rst property is crucial for the formation of students' preferences over university-
money pairs before they apply to the universities. The second property states that each
university oers nonnegative amount of scholarship to students and at least to one student
a strictly positive amount. The third property states that each university allocates its
2In our model, universities do not gain any utility from money they hold to themselves. Most of the funds
raised by universities are to be given specically as scholarship and the amount of scholarships given to the
students are about 0,1% of the universities total expenses.
3Take any university u 2 U, any subset S  S and any two students b s;s0 2 SS such that b s Pu s0: For
any responsive preference, we have (S [ b s) Pu (S [ s0):
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endowment among the students consistent with its preference ordering. The fourth property
is an ex-ante feasibility condition, which states that the amount of scholarship the university
allocates to the matched students cannot exceed the amount of endowment it has. The fth
property is a resource monotonicity condition, which states that a student, who receives
some positive amount of scholarship, receives less if the endowment of the university is
lowered. The last property rules out the universities, which have quotas more than one, to




, consider any endowment e 2 <
l+1
+ . A matching
 is individually rational if no student is assigned to a university that is worse than the
no-university option. Formally, a matching  2 M is individually rational for e 2 <
l+1
+
if for all s 2 S; (s) Rs uo: A university u 2 U, and a student s 2 S who is not assigned
to u at some matching  2 M can block the matching  under some scholarship rule h,
if university u prefers s to some of its assigned students at  and student s prefers being
assigned to u and having a scholarship hsu(e) to his/her present assignment and scholarship.
Formally, a matching  2 M is blocked by the university-student pair (u;s) 2 U  S
at e 2 <
l+1
+ under the scholarship rule h if (u;hsu(e)) Ps ((s);hs(s)(e)) and s Pu s for
some s 2  1(u). A matching  2 M is stable for e 2 <
l+1
+ under the scholarship rule
h if it is individually rational for e 2 <
l+1
+ and there is no university-student pair blocking
at e 2 <
l+1
+ . Let M(e;h) be the set of all stable matchings for e under h. Given any
scholarship rule h; a matching rule ' associates with each e 2 <
l+1
+ a matching : Given
any scholarship rule h; a stable matching rule ' associates with each e 2 <
l+1
+ some stable





be an environment. A matching rule ' is said to be manipulable via
destroying endowments by a university under some scholarship rule h if and only if
there exist two endowments e and e0 with e0
u < eu for some u 2 U and e0
u = eu for all
u 2 Unfug such that '[e0] 1(u) Pu '[e] 1(u).
Proposition 3.1 There exists an environment
 
A;q;RS;RU
such that all stable match-
ing rules are manipulable via destroying endowments by a university under any exogenous
scholarship rule h 2 H:
Proof. Let h 2 H: Let ' be any stable matching rule. Let S = fs1;s2;s3g, U = fu1;u2g.
Let q = (qu0;qu1;qu2) = (3;1;2): Let s3 Pu2 s1 Pu2 s2: Let e1 = 0 and e2 > 0 such that
4The equal rule, denoted by h=, where each university u oers each student the same portion of its
endowment as scholarship, and dened formally as h=
su = eu
qu 2 <+ for all s 2 S and all u 2 U [fu0g, belongs
to this class H. It is the unique exogenous scholarship rule which satises the ex-post eciency condition,
i.e., for all u 2 U; for all eu 2 <+; we have
P
s2C hsu(e) = eu for any C  S with jCj = qu:
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hs1u2(e) > 0: Consider the preference system represented below:















The matching  assigning s1 and s2 to u2, and s3 to u1, is the unique stable matching for
e under any h 2 H. Hence, '[e] = . Let e0 = (0;0;e0
2) = (0;0;0) 2 <2
+. The matching 
assigning s1 to u1 , s2 and s3 to u2, is the unique stable matching for e0 under any h 2 H:
Hence, '[e0] = : Thus, u2 is better o under any stable matching rule ' after destroying
some of its endowment.
We dene a destruction game as follows: Given any endowment e 2 <
l+1
+ ; each university
u 2 U [fu0g has a strategy du 2 [0;eu] = Du.5 Write D =
Q
U[fu0g Du for the set of strategy
proles. Every destruction d 2 D of endowments induces a new endowment e(d) = e   d.
Given any d;d0 2 D, we write d u d0 if and only if '[e(d)]
 1 (u) Ru '[e(d0)]
 1 (u): Let U




where ' is applied to e(d). Given any endowment e 2 <
l+1
+ ;
a strategy prole d 2 D is a Nash equilibrium of the game
 
D;';U
if for all u 2 U
and all d0 2 D with d0
 u = d u, we have d u d0.6 Let N(D;';U)  D denote the set of
Nash equilibria of (D;';U). Let N(D;';U) =
S
d2N(D;';U)f'[e(d)]g  M denote the
set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (D;';U).
Proposition 3.2 Let h 2 H be any scholarship rule. Let ' be any stable matching rule.
There exist an environment
 
A;q;RS;RU
and an endowment e 2 <
l+1
+ ; where the set of
stable matchings and the (nonempty) set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game are
disjoint, i.e. there exist
 
A;q;RS;RU
and e 2 <
l+1
+ s.t. N(D;';U) \ M(e;h) = ; and
N(D;';U) 6= ;.
Proof. Let h 2 H: Let ' be any stable matching rule. Let S = fs1;s2;s3g, U = fu1;u2g.
Let q = (qu0;qu1;qu2) = (3;1;2). Let e = (e0;e1;e2) 2 <3
+ be such that e1 < hs1u2(e)  e2.
5Since the ctitious university does not hold any endowments, we have Du0 = 0.
6Let d u denote a strategy prole of all universities except the university u.
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Consider the preference system represented below:















Let  be the matching assigning s1 and s2 to u2, and s3 to u1, and  the matching
assigning s1 to u1, s2 and s3 to u2. We have '[e] =  = M(e;h). Note that for all d 2 D;
we have (u2;hs2u2(e(d)))Ps2 (u1;hs2u1(e(d))) and (u1;hs3u1(e(d)))Ps3 (u2;hs3u2(e(d))). Let
also
D1 = fd 2 D j (u2;hs1u2(e(d)))Ps1 (u1;hs1u1(e(d)))g,
D2 = fd 2 D j (u1;hs1u1(e(d)))Ps1 (u2;hs1u2(e(d)))g,
D3 = fd 2 D j (u1;hs1u1(e(d)))Is1 (u2;hs1u2(e(d)))g.
Note that  is the unique stable matching for e(d) where d 2 D1, similarly v is the unique
stable matching for e(d) where d 2 D2. Furthermore,  and v are the stable matchings for
e(d) where d 2 D3.
First, we show that  2 N(D;';U). Take any d 2 D2 [ D3 such that '[e(d)] = .
Suppose one of the universities, call it u, changes its strategy and destroys some du 2 Du.













=  and both universities u1 and u2 get worse o. Hence, we have  2 N(D;';U).
To show that N(D;';U) \ M(e;h) = ;, it suces to show that  = 2 N(D;';U).
Take any d 2 D1 [D3 such that '[e(d)] = . Since (u2;hs1u2(e(d))) Rs1 (u1;hs1u1(e(d))),
we have hs1u2(e(d)) > hs1u1(e(d)). Let u2 change its strategy and destroy d0
2 such that
(u1;hs1u1(e(d))) Ps1 (u2;hs1u2(e(d0))) and d0 = (d1;d0
2) 2 D2. We have '[e(d0)] = . Since,
u2 is better o under  then under , we have  = 2 N(D;';U).
4 Concluding Remarks
In the classical framework with no endowments, Roth (1985) proved that all stable match-
ing rules are manipulable by a university via misrepresenting its preferences. In matching
problems with endowments, however, universities -by changing the amount of scholarship
they oer- aect students' preferences. More interestingly, under any stable matching rule,
by oering a lower scholarship, a university may have more preferred students than before
under a fairly wide class of exogenous scholarship rules.
Balinski and S onmez (1999) model a student placement problem where preferences of
universities are ctitious and based on the test scores of the students. They show that the
university optimal mechanism is manipulable by students via underscoring in test scores.
Test scores of the students can be interpreted as endowments of students.
We also show the existence of matching problems where the set of stable matchings
and the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game are disjoint. This result immediately
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implies the following two corollaries: The Nash equilibria of the destruction game may not be
stable. Furthermore, we cannot produce every stable (hence individually rational) matching
as an equilibrium of the destruction game. Now, we wish to compare these two results with
the ones in classical university-admission problems with no endowments. Roth (1985) shows
that the Nash equilibria of a preference revelation game (using a stable outcome function)
may not be stable with respect to the true preferences. However, any individually rational
matching with respect to the true preferences can be produced as an equilibrium of the
preference revelation game using a stable outcome function.
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